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Single Idea 22388

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect ]

Full Idea

The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended).

Gist of Idea

Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow

Source

Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Virtues and Vices' [Blackwell 1981], p.25


A Reaction

She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [assessing effects against side effects of an act]:

A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover]
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling]
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]