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Full Idea
The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended).
Gist of Idea
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
Source
Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Virtues and Vices' [Blackwell 1981], p.25
A Reaction
She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it.
| 22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
| 22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
| 22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
| 22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
| 22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
| 22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |