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Single Idea 22412
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
]
Full Idea
In the Lockean tradition, secondary qualities are defined as those whose instantiation in an object consists in a power or disposition of the object to produce sensory experiences in perceivers of a certain phenomenological character.
Gist of Idea
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
Source
Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 2)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'The Subjective View' [OUP 1983], p.5
A Reaction
Primary qualities are said to lack such dispositions. Not sure about these definitions. Primaries offer no experiences? With these definitions, comparing them would be a category mistake. I take it primaries reflect reality and secondaries do not.
The
74 ideas
from Colin McGinn
6042
|
The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
[McGinn]
|
6051
|
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
[McGinn]
|
6055
|
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
[McGinn]
|
6059
|
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
[McGinn]
|
6050
|
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
[McGinn]
|
6052
|
Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
[McGinn]
|
6049
|
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
[McGinn]
|
6043
|
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
[McGinn]
|
6058
|
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
|
6053
|
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
[McGinn]
|
6054
|
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
[McGinn]
|
6044
|
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
[McGinn]
|
6046
|
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
[McGinn]
|
6045
|
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
[McGinn]
|
6047
|
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
[McGinn]
|
6048
|
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
[McGinn]
|
6062
|
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
[McGinn]
|
6065
|
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
[McGinn]
|
6067
|
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
[McGinn]
|
6069
|
'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
[McGinn]
|
6068
|
We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
[McGinn]
|
6066
|
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
[McGinn]
|
6071
|
Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
[McGinn]
|
6072
|
If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
[McGinn]
|
6073
|
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined
[McGinn]
|
6064
|
Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
[McGinn]
|
6070
|
Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
[McGinn]
|
6075
|
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
[McGinn]
|
6074
|
Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
[McGinn]
|
6077
|
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
[McGinn]
|
6081
|
Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
[McGinn]
|
6082
|
If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
[McGinn]
|
6080
|
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
[McGinn]
|
6079
|
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
[McGinn]
|
6088
|
Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
[McGinn]
|
6084
|
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
[McGinn]
|
6085
|
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
[McGinn]
|
6083
|
The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
[McGinn]
|
6086
|
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
[McGinn]
|
6087
|
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
[McGinn]
|
4690
|
If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind
[McGinn]
|
4691
|
If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech
[McGinn]
|
2543
|
Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism
[McGinn]
|
2544
|
Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality
[McGinn]
|
2545
|
Free will is mental causation in action
[McGinn]
|
2546
|
Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge
[McGinn]
|
2547
|
There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood
[McGinn]
|
2539
|
Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion
[McGinn]
|
2540
|
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind
[McGinn]
|
2542
|
Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity
[McGinn]
|
12019
|
McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity
[Forbes,G on McGinn]
|
18892
|
Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me?
[McGinn]
|
7388
|
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines
[Dennett on McGinn]
|
3185
|
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts
[McGinn]
|
6171
|
Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions
[McGinn]
|
22413
|
Being red simply consists in looking red
[McGinn]
|
22415
|
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements
[McGinn]
|
22416
|
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible
[McGinn]
|
18410
|
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness
[McGinn]
|
22417
|
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes
[McGinn]
|
22414
|
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness
[McGinn]
|
22412
|
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
[McGinn]
|
22418
|
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases
[McGinn]
|
22420
|
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant
[McGinn]
|
18402
|
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act
[McGinn]
|
22421
|
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
[McGinn]
|
22424
|
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
[McGinn]
|
22425
|
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
[McGinn]
|
22423
|
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature
[McGinn]
|
22426
|
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created
[McGinn]
|
22422
|
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities
[McGinn]
|
22427
|
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience
[McGinn]
|
22428
|
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square
[McGinn]
|
7629
|
We see objects 'directly' by representing them
[McGinn]
|