more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 22414
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
]
Full Idea
To grasp what it is for something to be square it is not constitutively necessary to know how square things look or feel, since what it is to be square does not involve any such relation to experience.
Gist of Idea
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness
Source
Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 2)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'The Subjective View' [OUP 1983], p.8
A Reaction
You could even describe squareness verbally, unlike redness. It seems crucial that almost any sense (such as bat echoes) can communicate primary qualities, but secondary qualities are tied to a sense, and wouldn't exist without it.
Related Idea
Idea 22413
Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
The
19 ideas
from 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'
22413
|
Being red simply consists in looking red
[McGinn]
|
22415
|
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements
[McGinn]
|
22416
|
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible
[McGinn]
|
22412
|
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
[McGinn]
|
22414
|
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness
[McGinn]
|
18410
|
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness
[McGinn]
|
22417
|
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes
[McGinn]
|
22418
|
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases
[McGinn]
|
22420
|
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant
[McGinn]
|
22423
|
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature
[McGinn]
|
22426
|
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created
[McGinn]
|
18402
|
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act
[McGinn]
|
22421
|
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
[McGinn]
|
22424
|
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
[McGinn]
|
22425
|
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
[McGinn]
|
22422
|
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities
[McGinn]
|
22427
|
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience
[McGinn]
|
22428
|
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square
[McGinn]
|
7629
|
We see objects 'directly' by representing them
[McGinn]
|