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Single Idea 22421
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
]
Full Idea
Can we form a conception of a type of mind whose representations are free of secondary quality perceptions?
Gist of Idea
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
Source
Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 6)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'The Subjective View' [OUP 1983], p.73
A Reaction
Nice question. Minds must have experiences, and there has to be a 'way' or 'mode' for those experiences. A mind which directly grasped the primary quality of sphericity would seem to be visionary rather than sensual or experiential.
The
19 ideas
from 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'
22413
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Being red simply consists in looking red
[McGinn]
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22415
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Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements
[McGinn]
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22416
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Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible
[McGinn]
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22412
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Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
[McGinn]
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22414
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You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness
[McGinn]
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18410
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Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness
[McGinn]
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22417
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Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes
[McGinn]
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22418
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I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases
[McGinn]
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22420
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The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant
[McGinn]
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22423
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Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature
[McGinn]
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22426
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We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created
[McGinn]
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18402
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Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act
[McGinn]
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22421
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Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
[McGinn]
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22424
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Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
[McGinn]
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22425
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The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
[McGinn]
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22422
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Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities
[McGinn]
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22427
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To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience
[McGinn]
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22428
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You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square
[McGinn]
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7629
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We see objects 'directly' by representing them
[McGinn]
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