more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 22422

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary ]

Full Idea

The inseparability thesis about perception says that for any actual and possible sense the content of experiences delivered by that sense must be both of secondary qualities and of primary qualities.

Gist of Idea

Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities

Source

Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 6)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'The Subjective View' [OUP 1983], p.81


A Reaction

That would mean that all possible experience must have a mode of presentation, and also must be 'of' something independent of experience. So a yellow after-image would not count as an 'experience'?


The 19 ideas from 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'

Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]