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Single Idea 22428

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary ]

Full Idea

To grasp what it is to be red is to know the kind of sensory experience red things produce; ...but it is not true that to grasp what it is to be square one needs to know what kinds of sensory experience square things produce.

Gist of Idea

You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square

Source

Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 8)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'The Subjective View' [OUP 1983], p.138


A Reaction

Are any experiences involved in the understanding of squareness? We don't know squareness by a priori intuition (do we?). To grasp squareness if may be necessary to have a variety of experiences of it. Or to grasp that it is primary.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [dividing qualities into different types]:

Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke]
We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke]
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant]
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil]