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Single Idea 22432
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
]
Full Idea
Ordinarily the conditional is not thought of as true or false at all, but rather the consequent is thought of as conditionally true or false given the antecedent.
Gist of Idea
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value
Source
Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], III)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.143
A Reaction
At first this seems obvious, but a conditional asserts a relationship between two propositions, and so presumably it is true if that relationship exists. 'Is it actually true that if it is Monday then everyone in the office is depressed?'.
The
326 ideas
from Willard Quine
19046
|
Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism
[Quine]
|
19047
|
Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful
[Quine]
|
19048
|
Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences
[Quine]
|
19049
|
In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning
[Quine]
|
19050
|
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences
[Quine]
|
13010
|
In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic
[Boghossian on Quine]
|
13829
|
If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter
[Hacking on Quine]
|
9001
|
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?'
[Quine]
|
9003
|
Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling
[Quine]
|
9004
|
If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic
[Quine]
|
9002
|
Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables
[Quine]
|
13681
|
Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions
[Quine, by Sider]
|
9005
|
Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge
[Quine]
|
9006
|
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
[Quine]
|
22153
|
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct
[Quine, by Boulter]
|
19485
|
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
[Quine]
|
19486
|
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers
[Quine]
|
19487
|
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses
[Quine]
|
7627
|
You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology
[Maund on Quine]
|
8871
|
We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired
[Quine, by Davidson]
|
8826
|
If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge
[Kim on Quine]
|
8827
|
Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs
[Kim on Quine]
|
1635
|
Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper
[Quine]
|
8898
|
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence
[Quine]
|
8899
|
Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence
[Quine]
|
8900
|
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity
[Quine]
|
10370
|
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions
[Quine, by Schaffer,J]
|
8789
|
Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic
[Hale/Wright on Quine]
|
5745
|
Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism
[Melia on Quine]
|
4216
|
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth
[Quine, by Lowe]
|
14490
|
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it
[Thomasson on Quine]
|
16966
|
Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that
[Quine]
|
18966
|
Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified
[Quine]
|
16961
|
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables
[Quine]
|
16963
|
Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants
[Quine]
|
16964
|
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true
[Quine]
|
16965
|
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express
[Quine]
|
18438
|
Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states
[Quine]
|
9763
|
For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary
[Quine]
|
9764
|
Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy
[Quine]
|
11092
|
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process
[Quine]
|
17595
|
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
[Quine]
|
11095
|
We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse
[Quine]
|
11094
|
'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop
[Quine]
|
11093
|
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape
[Quine]
|
11096
|
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree
[Quine]
|
11097
|
Red is the largest red thing in the universe
[Quine]
|
11101
|
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do
[Quine]
|
11099
|
Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object
[Quine]
|
11104
|
Concepts are language
[Quine]
|
11102
|
Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms
[Quine]
|
11103
|
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it
[Quine]
|
19045
|
Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability
[Quine]
|
18439
|
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
[Quine]
|
18440
|
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive
[Quine]
|
18441
|
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation)
[Quine]
|
18442
|
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it
[Quine]
|
13589
|
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism
[Quine]
|
13588
|
A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits
[Quine]
|
8483
|
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry
[Quine]
|
13590
|
Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates
[Quine]
|
13591
|
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn
[Quine]
|
13592
|
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines
[Quine]
|
18170
|
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed
[Quine]
|
21338
|
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage
[Quine]
|
19321
|
We might do without names, by converting them into predicates
[Quine, by Kirkham]
|
12221
|
'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate'
[Quine]
|
21686
|
Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables
[Quine]
|
21685
|
Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science
[Quine]
|
12219
|
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
10921
|
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences
[Quine]
|
10922
|
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into
[Quine]
|
10923
|
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties
[Quine]
|
10924
|
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves
[Quine]
|
13713
|
Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones
[Quine, by Sider]
|
22430
|
If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth
[Quine]
|
22432
|
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value
[Quine]
|
22431
|
Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements
[Quine]
|
22433
|
It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless
[Quine]
|
22435
|
The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then
[Quine]
|
22437
|
Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept
[Quine]
|
22434
|
Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it
[Quine]
|
22436
|
Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language
[Quine]
|
22438
|
Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with
[Quine]
|
8205
|
Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time
[Quine]
|
8207
|
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases
[Quine]
|
8206
|
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia
[Quine]
|
8208
|
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise
[Quine]
|
7375
|
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences
[Quine, by Dennett]
|
16932
|
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer
[Quine]
|
16933
|
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
[Quine]
|
16934
|
General terms depend on similarities among things
[Quine]
|
16935
|
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another
[Quine]
|
16936
|
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red'
[Quine]
|
16937
|
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle
[Quine]
|
16938
|
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour?
[Quine]
|
8486
|
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped
[Quine]
|
16939
|
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation
[Quine]
|
16941
|
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause
[Quine]
|
16940
|
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations
[Quine]
|
16942
|
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained
[Quine]
|
16943
|
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point
[Quine]
|
16944
|
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method
[Quine]
|
16945
|
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve
[Quine]
|
16947
|
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine
[Quine]
|
16948
|
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity'
[Quine]
|
16949
|
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations
[Quine]
|
21748
|
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method
[Quine]
|
21749
|
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices
[Quine]
|
21750
|
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation
[Quine]
|
21751
|
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself
[Quine]
|
4577
|
There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity
[Quine]
|
9879
|
NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions
[Quine, by Dummett]
|
21696
|
Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes)
[Quine]
|
21697
|
The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand
[Quine]
|
21698
|
All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic
[Quine]
|
10241
|
For Quine, there is only one way to exist
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
12210
|
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical
[Fine,K on Quine]
|
4064
|
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin
[Quine, by Crane]
|
19277
|
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away
[Quine, by Hale]
|
8455
|
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8456
|
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
1619
|
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations
[Dennett on Quine]
|
19159
|
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them
[Quine, by Davidson]
|
8459
|
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
16261
|
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication
[Maudlin on Quine]
|
4443
|
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment
[Quine, by Armstrong]
|
8856
|
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori
[Quine, by Yablo]
|
7698
|
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available
[Jacquette on Quine]
|
15402
|
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
[Quine]
|
1617
|
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy
[Quine]
|
1609
|
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'
[Quine]
|
1611
|
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those
[Quine]
|
1610
|
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun
[Quine]
|
1614
|
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made
[Quine]
|
1615
|
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients
[Quine]
|
1613
|
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities
[Quine]
|
1612
|
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
[Quine]
|
1616
|
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning
[Quine]
|
1618
|
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts
[Quine]
|
8496
|
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
[Quine]
|
8497
|
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences
[Quine]
|
8498
|
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
[Quine]
|
18209
|
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
[Quine]
|
12443
|
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
[Quine]
|
8470
|
Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
18963
|
Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms
[Quine]
|
1633
|
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions
[Quine]
|
18964
|
Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual
[Quine]
|
18965
|
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
[Quine]
|
21642
|
If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology
[Quine]
|
1634
|
Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory
[Quine]
|
10014
|
Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects
[Quine, by Hodes]
|
9012
|
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
[Quine]
|
9011
|
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence
[Quine]
|
9009
|
Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth
[Quine]
|
9007
|
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition
[Quine]
|
9008
|
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences
[Quine]
|
9010
|
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence
[Quine]
|
9019
|
Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times
[Quine]
|
9018
|
A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time
[Quine]
|
9017
|
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
[Quine]
|
9013
|
We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)'
[Quine]
|
9016
|
Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication
[Quine]
|
9015
|
Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification
[Quine]
|
9014
|
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q)
[Quine]
|
9020
|
My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification
[Quine]
|
9021
|
A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true
[Quine]
|
10828
|
Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities
[Quine]
|
10012
|
Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity
[Quine]
|
10705
|
Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity
[Quine]
|
9025
|
You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named
[Quine]
|
9026
|
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects
[Quine]
|
9024
|
Excluded middle has three different definitions
[Quine]
|
9023
|
If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject
[Quine]
|
9028
|
Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages
[Quine]
|
9027
|
A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true
[Quine]
|
18967
|
A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence
[Quine]
|
18968
|
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition?
[Quine]
|
18969
|
How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs?
[Quine]
|
18970
|
The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position
[Quine]
|
9471
|
Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised
[Quine]
|
9201
|
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
9203
|
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
10925
|
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential
[Quine]
|
10926
|
Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense
[Quine]
|
14645
|
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to
[Quine]
|
10927
|
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified
[Quine]
|
10930
|
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence
[Quine]
|
10928
|
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely
[Quine]
|
10931
|
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally
[Quine]
|
15788
|
Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject
[Quine, by Lycan]
|
9379
|
A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it
[Quine]
|
10801
|
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions
[Quine]
|
18198
|
Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted
[Quine]
|
14296
|
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term
[Quine]
|
21700
|
Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible
[Quine]
|
21699
|
Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects
[Quine]
|
21701
|
Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it
[Quine]
|
8461
|
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes
[Quine]
|
8462
|
A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental
[Quine]
|
8463
|
Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory
[Quine]
|
21717
|
Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions
[Quine, by Linsky,B]
|
21687
|
It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience
[Quine]
|
21688
|
There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories
[Quine]
|
5747
|
"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions
[Quine, by Melia]
|
13387
|
Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects
[Quine]
|
7925
|
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
[Quine]
|
8277
|
I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity'
[Lowe on Quine]
|
1630
|
We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract)
[Quine]
|
1631
|
You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs
[Quine]
|
1632
|
Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages
[Quine]
|
6564
|
To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not'
[Quine]
|
10242
|
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately
[Quine]
|
10243
|
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc.
[Quine]
|
20296
|
Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases
[Quine, by Rey]
|
8998
|
Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false
[Quine]
|
8999
|
Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions
[Quine]
|
9000
|
If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role?
[Quine]
|
10064
|
Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism
[Quine, by Musgrave]
|
8993
|
If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic
[Quine]
|
8994
|
If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry
[Quine]
|
8995
|
Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute
[Quine]
|
8996
|
If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money...
[Quine]
|
8997
|
There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry
[Quine]
|
9204
|
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions
[Fine,K on Quine]
|
17738
|
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics
[Jenkins on Quine]
|
15090
|
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths
[Quine, by Shoemaker]
|
12188
|
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity
[Quine, by McFetridge]
|
19492
|
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology
[Yablo on Quine]
|
7317
|
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous
[Quine, by Miller,A]
|
9383
|
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori
[Boghossian on Quine]
|
12424
|
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori
[Quine, by Kitcher]
|
9337
|
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori
[Quine, by Horwich]
|
9338
|
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science
[Horwich on Quine]
|
9340
|
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right
[Horwich on Quine]
|
19488
|
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations
[Quine, by Yablo]
|
9366
|
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori
[Quine, by Boghossian]
|
14473
|
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution
[Quine, by Thomasson]
|
7321
|
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best
[Miller,A on Quine]
|
8803
|
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language
[Davidson on Quine]
|
17737
|
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation
[Quine, by Jenkins]
|
9371
|
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy
[Quine]
|
10929
|
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning
[Quine]
|
1620
|
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
[Quine]
|
1621
|
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
[Quine]
|
1622
|
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
[Quine]
|
1623
|
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it
[Quine]
|
1624
|
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
[Quine]
|
1625
|
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body
[Quine]
|
1626
|
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
[Quine]
|
1627
|
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system
[Quine]
|
1628
|
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
[Quine]
|
1629
|
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
[Quine]
|
8202
|
Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words
[Quine]
|
8201
|
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction
[Quine]
|
8203
|
All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets
[Quine]
|
21689
|
A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself?
[Quine]
|
21690
|
Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on
[Quine]
|
21691
|
Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions
[Quine]
|
21692
|
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox
[Quine]
|
21693
|
Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set
[Quine]
|
21694
|
Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical
[Quine]
|
21695
|
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one
[Quine]
|
19042
|
Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined
[Quine]
|
19043
|
Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object
[Quine]
|
13639
|
Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
21557
|
Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language
[Quine, by Lackey]
|
6891
|
Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory
[Quine, by Mautner]
|
4630
|
Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another
[Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
|
3131
|
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism
[Quine, by Rey]
|
3988
|
Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states
[Dennett on Quine]
|
6310
|
Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available
[Quine]
|
6311
|
The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge
[Quine]
|
6312
|
We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai'
[Quine]
|
6313
|
Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive
[Quine]
|
6314
|
Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them
[Quine]
|
6317
|
Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation
[Quine]
|
6315
|
We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs
[Quine]
|
12798
|
Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether
[Quine]
|
16462
|
The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation
[Quine]
|
8464
|
Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected
[Quine]
|
8482
|
Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist?
[Quine]
|
12136
|
Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged
[Brody on Quine]
|
8504
|
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes
[Quine, by Devitt]
|
15723
|
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal'
[Quine]
|
15490
|
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them
[Quine, by Martin,CB]
|
15725
|
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false.
[Quine]
|
15722
|
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known
[Quine]
|
15719
|
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is
[Quine]
|
15720
|
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context
[Quine]
|
15721
|
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures
[Quine]
|
15724
|
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science
[Quine]
|
17594
|
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy'
[Quine]
|
7924
|
The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science
[Quine]
|
17905
|
Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity
[Quine]
|
9556
|
Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects
[Quine]
|
8466
|
For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8467
|
Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8453
|
If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
[Quine]
|
10311
|
No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts
[Quine, by Hale]
|
10538
|
Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction
[Quine, by Dummett]
|
10793
|
Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal
[Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
13736
|
Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure
[Schaffer,J on Quine]
|
17862
|
Essence gives an illusion of understanding
[Quine, by Almog]
|
3336
|
Two things can never entail three things
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
10211
|
Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
3302
|
Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
15783
|
Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist
[Lycan on Quine]
|
3751
|
Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true
[Quine, by Jacquette]
|
10295
|
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
3322
|
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
6078
|
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
|
8479
|
Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8534
|
Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications
[Quine, by Armstrong]
|
3325
|
For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
10667
|
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible
[Quine, by Hossack]
|
16021
|
Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology)
[Quine, by Noonan]
|
2796
|
For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically
[Quine, by Dancy,J]
|
15782
|
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia
[Quine, by Lycan]
|
8450
|
Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
3868
|
To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it
[Quine, by Newton-Smith]
|
4713
|
For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations
[Quine, by O'Grady]
|
4712
|
Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable'
[Quine, by O'Grady]
|
7330
|
The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants
[Quine, by Miller,A]
|
7970
|
Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist
[Quine, by Macdonald,C]
|