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Single Idea 22445
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
]
Full Idea
While one can determine from the concept of morality that there is an objection to murder one cannot determine completely what will count as murder.
Gist of Idea
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
Source
Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7)
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.7
A Reaction
She then refers to abortion, but there are military and criminal problem cases, and killings by neglect or side effect.
Related Idea
Idea 22446
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
The
94 ideas
from Philippa Foot
22383
|
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights
[Foot]
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22384
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A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable
[Foot]
|
22385
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The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended
[Foot]
|
22386
|
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it
[Foot]
|
22387
|
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse
[Foot]
|
22388
|
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
[Foot]
|
22371
|
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors
[Foot]
|
22372
|
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive
[Foot]
|
22373
|
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing
[Foot]
|
22380
|
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function
[Foot]
|
22381
|
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities
[Foot]
|
23434
|
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark'
[Foot]
|
23431
|
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects
[Foot]
|
23433
|
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots
[Foot]
|
23432
|
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things
[Foot]
|
23435
|
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?'
[Foot]
|
23436
|
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
[Foot]
|
23438
|
Full rationality must include morality
[Foot]
|
23437
|
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
[Foot]
|
23439
|
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life
[Foot]
|
4692
|
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable
[Foot]
|
4693
|
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive')
[Foot]
|
4694
|
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one
[Foot]
|
22456
|
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement
[Foot]
|
22469
|
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
[Foot]
|
22468
|
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
[Foot]
|
22470
|
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
[Foot]
|
22465
|
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
[Foot]
|
22466
|
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
[Foot]
|
22467
|
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
[Foot]
|
22448
|
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
[Foot]
|
22444
|
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
[Foot]
|
22445
|
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
[Foot]
|
22446
|
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
[Foot]
|
22447
|
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
[Foot]
|
22481
|
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation
[Foot, by PG]
|
22482
|
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does
[Foot]
|
22485
|
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
[Foot]
|
22486
|
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
[Foot]
|
22487
|
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
[Foot]
|
22377
|
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
[Foot]
|
22378
|
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
[Foot]
|
22375
|
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
[Foot]
|
22376
|
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness
[Foot]
|
23683
|
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23684
|
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
22379
|
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
[Foot]
|
23690
|
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
22449
|
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people'
[Foot]
|
22451
|
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble
[Foot]
|
22452
|
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it?
[Foot]
|
23685
|
Reason is not a motivator of morality
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23691
|
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent
[Foot]
|
22389
|
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does
[Foot]
|
22391
|
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
[Foot]
|
22392
|
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable'
[Foot]
|
23686
|
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23687
|
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
22491
|
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning
[Foot]
|
23695
|
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent
[Foot]
|
23693
|
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required
[Foot]
|
23694
|
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will
[Foot]
|
22492
|
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees
[Foot]
|
22493
|
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not
[Foot]
|
22496
|
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime
[Foot]
|
22495
|
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory
[Foot]
|
22497
|
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life
[Foot]
|
22498
|
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends
[Foot]
|
22499
|
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life
[Foot]
|
22502
|
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment
[Foot]
|
22472
|
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality
[Foot]
|
22474
|
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility
[Foot]
|
22477
|
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
[Foot]
|
22478
|
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts
[Foot]
|
22479
|
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees
[Foot]
|
22480
|
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
[Foot]
|
23692
|
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions
[Foot]
|
22393
|
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires
[Foot]
|
22395
|
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires
[Foot]
|
22458
|
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness
[Foot]
|
22459
|
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
[Foot]
|
22460
|
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad?
[Foot]
|
22461
|
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions
[Foot]
|
22462
|
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it
[Foot]
|
22463
|
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community
[Foot]
|
22464
|
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon
[Foot]
|
23145
|
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings
[Foot, by Driver]
|
22398
|
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation
[Foot]
|
22400
|
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety
[Foot]
|
22403
|
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism
[Foot]
|
22402
|
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions
[Foot]
|
22401
|
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous
[Foot]
|
22396
|
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual
[Foot]
|
22397
|
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained
[Foot]
|