more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 22447

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value ]

Full Idea

When we say that something 'just is' right or wrong we want to give the impression of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words, ...maintaining the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there.

Gist of Idea

Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity

Source

Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.9)

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.9


A Reaction

Foot favours the idea that such a claim must depend on reasons, and that the reasons arise out of actual living. She's right.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [values independent of points of view]:

Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth]
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]