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Single Idea 22454

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism ]

Full Idea

Williams argued that we can tolerate inconsistency in moral principles though not in assertions, and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the latter but not of the former to reflect an 'independent order of things'.

Gist of Idea

We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order)

Source

report of Bernard Williams (Consistency and realism (with 1972 note) [1966]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.37

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.37

A Reaction

Put like this, Williams seems to beg the question, which is whether there is an independent moral order to things. There seems to be an easy answer, which is that we are only intolerant of inconsistency when we are confident about it.

Related Idea

Idea 22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]

The 10 ideas with the same theme [there is no objective knowledge about ethics]:

4867 Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza]
7163 Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
18311 Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
18324 There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
4761 The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
22454 We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
22450 If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
23688 Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright]