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Single Idea 22454

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism ]

Full Idea

Williams argued that we can tolerate inconsistency in moral principles though not in assertions, and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the latter but not of the former to reflect an 'independent order of things'.

Gist of Idea

We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order)

Source

report of Bernard Williams (Consistency and realism (with 1972 note) [1966]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.37

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.37

A Reaction

Put like this, Williams seems to beg the question, which is whether there is an independent moral order to things. There seems to be an easy answer, which is that we are only intolerant of inconsistency when we are confident about it.

Related Idea

Idea 22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]

The 65 ideas from Bernard Williams

22454 We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
22407 Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
22410 Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22408 Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
22411 For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
22409 We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
4110 Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
4113 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
4112 A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
4114 Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
4116 A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
4120 It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
4121 Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
4122 If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
4124 Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
4131 Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
4133 Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
4132 The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
4128 Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
4134 The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
4135 Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
4244 It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
4243 Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
4245 Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
4246 Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
4247 It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
4252 Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
4250 The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
4249 "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
4248 Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
22355 In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
22455 Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
20168 Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
20167 Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
3234 Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
3233 Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
3235 It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
3236 Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
9284 Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
23282 If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
24008 Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
24009 Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
23278 For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23279 It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
23280 Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
7946 The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
3238 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
3239 You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
23283 Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
22450 If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
4366 We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]