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Single Idea 22459
[filed under theme 23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
]
Full Idea
It would be irrational to obey even the most useful rule if in a particular instance we clearly see that such obedience will not have the best results.
Gist of Idea
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
Source
Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.62)
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.62
A Reaction
This is the simple reason why attempts at rule utilitarianism always lead back to act utilitarianism. Another way of putting it is that a good rule can only be assessed by the outcomes of individual acts that follow it.
The
94 ideas
from Philippa Foot
22383
|
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights
[Foot]
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22384
|
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable
[Foot]
|
22385
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The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended
[Foot]
|
22386
|
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it
[Foot]
|
22388
|
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
[Foot]
|
22387
|
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse
[Foot]
|
22371
|
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors
[Foot]
|
22372
|
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive
[Foot]
|
22373
|
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing
[Foot]
|
22380
|
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function
[Foot]
|
22381
|
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities
[Foot]
|
23434
|
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark'
[Foot]
|
23432
|
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things
[Foot]
|
23433
|
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots
[Foot]
|
23431
|
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects
[Foot]
|
23435
|
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?'
[Foot]
|
23436
|
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
[Foot]
|
23437
|
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
[Foot]
|
23438
|
Full rationality must include morality
[Foot]
|
23439
|
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life
[Foot]
|
4692
|
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable
[Foot]
|
4693
|
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive')
[Foot]
|
4694
|
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one
[Foot]
|
22456
|
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement
[Foot]
|
22469
|
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
[Foot]
|
22468
|
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
[Foot]
|
22470
|
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
[Foot]
|
22465
|
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
[Foot]
|
22466
|
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
[Foot]
|
22467
|
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
[Foot]
|
22448
|
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
[Foot]
|
22444
|
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
[Foot]
|
22445
|
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
[Foot]
|
22446
|
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
[Foot]
|
22447
|
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
[Foot]
|
22481
|
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation
[Foot, by PG]
|
22482
|
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does
[Foot]
|
22485
|
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
[Foot]
|
22486
|
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
[Foot]
|
22487
|
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
[Foot]
|
22377
|
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
[Foot]
|
22378
|
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
[Foot]
|
22375
|
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
[Foot]
|
22376
|
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness
[Foot]
|
23684
|
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23683
|
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
22379
|
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
[Foot]
|
23690
|
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
22449
|
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people'
[Foot]
|
22451
|
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble
[Foot]
|
22452
|
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it?
[Foot]
|
23685
|
Reason is not a motivator of morality
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23691
|
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent
[Foot]
|
22389
|
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does
[Foot]
|
22391
|
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
[Foot]
|
22392
|
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable'
[Foot]
|
23686
|
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23687
|
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings
[Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
23693
|
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required
[Foot]
|
23694
|
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will
[Foot]
|
22491
|
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning
[Foot]
|
23695
|
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent
[Foot]
|
22492
|
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees
[Foot]
|
22493
|
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not
[Foot]
|
22495
|
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory
[Foot]
|
22496
|
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime
[Foot]
|
22497
|
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life
[Foot]
|
22498
|
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends
[Foot]
|
22499
|
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life
[Foot]
|
22502
|
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment
[Foot]
|
22472
|
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality
[Foot]
|
22474
|
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility
[Foot]
|
22477
|
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
[Foot]
|
22478
|
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts
[Foot]
|
22479
|
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees
[Foot]
|
22480
|
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
[Foot]
|
23692
|
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions
[Foot]
|
22393
|
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires
[Foot]
|
22395
|
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires
[Foot]
|
22458
|
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness
[Foot]
|
22459
|
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
[Foot]
|
22460
|
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad?
[Foot]
|
22461
|
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions
[Foot]
|
22462
|
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it
[Foot]
|
22463
|
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community
[Foot]
|
22464
|
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon
[Foot]
|
23145
|
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings
[Foot, by Driver]
|
22398
|
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation
[Foot]
|
22400
|
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety
[Foot]
|
22402
|
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions
[Foot]
|
22403
|
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism
[Foot]
|
22401
|
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous
[Foot]
|
22396
|
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual
[Foot]
|
22397
|
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained
[Foot]
|