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Full Idea
We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
Gist of Idea
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
Source
Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.88
A Reaction
She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
Related Ideas
Idea 22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
Idea 22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
| 22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
| 22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
| 22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
| 22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
| 22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| 23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
| 4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
| 6896 | Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner] |
| 6897 | Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner] |
| 7293 | It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |