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Single Idea 22466

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect ]

Full Idea

We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.

Gist of Idea

We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences

Source

Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.88


A Reaction

Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.

Related Idea

Idea 22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]


The 14 ideas with the same theme [assessing effects against side effects of an act]:

A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover]
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling]
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]