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Single Idea 22477

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism ]

Full Idea

No one thinks that calling a knife a good knife, a farmer a good farmer, a speech a good speech, a root a good root, necessarily expresses or even involves an attitude or feeling towards it.

Gist of Idea

Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings

Source

Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.163)

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.163

A Reaction

This is the Aristotelian idea (which I favour) that good derives from function. In such a case it seems obvious that it has nothing to do with expressing emotions.

Related Idea

Idea 22478 The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]

The 30 ideas with the same theme [morality is just an expression of feelings]:

2360 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes]
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22382 We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume]
21409 Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
6196 People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
20237 Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
20238 Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
21741 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
23689 Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations [Stevenson,CL]
6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
5206 To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22477 Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
8035 In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
8037 The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
8040 Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
8042 Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
2853 Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
2852 Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
2849 Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
2850 How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
2848 Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
2851 Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
4375 Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]