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Full Idea
What all these [non-cognitivist] theories try to do is to give the conditions of use of sentences such as 'It is morally objectionable to break promises', in terms of something which must be true about the speaker.
Gist of Idea
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
Source
Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.192
A Reaction
A wonderfully simple and accurate analysis of this view. Compare analysing 'there is a bus coming towards you' in the same way. Sounds silly, but lots of modern philosophers see things that way.
| 4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 7163 | Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche] |
| 18311 | Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche] |
| 18324 | There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche] |
| 22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
| 4761 | The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel] |
| 22454 | We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot] |
| 22453 | Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot] |
| 22450 | If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot] |
| 23688 | Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright] |