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Single Idea 22486

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism ]

Full Idea

The mistake is to think that whatever 'grounds' for a moral judgement may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral judgement, because he has not got the attitude or feeling.

Gist of Idea

The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings

Source

Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.192


A Reaction

This is roughly the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism, of how we still make moral judgements about situations where we ourselves are entirely disinterested (such as ancient historical events).