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Single Idea 22489
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
]
Full Idea
Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
Gist of Idea
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red'
Source
report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Natural Goodness' [OUP 2003], p.2
A Reaction
[In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
The
27 ideas
from Peter Geach
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10731
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For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world
[Geach]
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10732
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If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible
[Geach]
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10733
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The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not'
[Geach]
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10734
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Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck'
[Geach]
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10735
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Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times'
[Geach]
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22489
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'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red'
[Geach, by Foot]
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2567
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You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens
[Geach]
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2568
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Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours
[Geach]
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8769
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If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts
[Geach]
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8770
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'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group
[Geach]
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8771
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'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience
[Geach]
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8772
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We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted
[Geach]
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8773
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Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects
[Geach]
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8774
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The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages
[Geach]
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8775
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A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction
[Geach]
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8776
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We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too
[Geach]
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8778
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Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently
[Geach]
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8777
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If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted?
[Geach]
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8779
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We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience
[Geach]
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8780
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Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2'
[Geach]
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8781
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The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them
[Geach]
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11910
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Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X'
[Geach]
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8969
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We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category
[Geach, by Hawthorne]
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16075
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Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory
[Wasserman on Geach]
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12154
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Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting?
[Geach, by Perry]
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16073
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Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate
[Geach, by Wasserman]
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12152
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Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as'
[Geach]
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