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Single Idea 22501

[filed under theme 20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory ]

Full Idea

Nietzsche thought profoundly mistaken a taxonomy that classified actions as the doing of this or that, insisting that the true nature of an action depended rather on the nature of the individual who did it.

Gist of Idea

Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act

Source

report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885], 7) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 7

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Natural Goodness' [OUP 2003], p.110


A Reaction

This is more in the spirit of Aristotle than in the modern legalistic style. It seems to totally ignore consequences, which would puzzle victims or beneficiaries of the action.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the nature of action]:

All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche]
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
Philosophy of action studies the roles of psychological states in causing behaviour [Mele]
There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes]
Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]