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Single Idea 22504

[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will ]

Full Idea

A human being is a starting point of some actions, and he alone of animals; for of nothing else should we say that it acted.

Gist of Idea

Only a human being can be a starting point for an action

Source

Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b19)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Eudemian Ethics I,II and VIII', ed/tr. Woods,Michael [OUP 1992], p.21

A Reaction

It is a standard dogma that the idea of free will does not occur in Plato or Aristotle, but this looks awfully like it. I don't agree about animals. You watch them judging whether they can make a leap, and then doing it.

Related Idea

Idea 22508 Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]

The 44 ideas from 'Eudemian Ethics'

5865 Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
5866 It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
18230 No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
5868 Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
5869 The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
5870 Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
5871 Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
5872 Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
5873 Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
20204 Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
5874 Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
5875 Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
22504 Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
22505 The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
22506 A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
22507 An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
23319 We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
22508 Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
22509 What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
22512 Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
22513 Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
22510 Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
22514 The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
22515 Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
22516 Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
5876 Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
22517 We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
5877 We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
23905 Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
23906 Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
23908 If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
23909 Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
23910 Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
23911 Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
23912 Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
23913 Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
23914 People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
23917 Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
23918 Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
23919 Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
23920 Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
23915 The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
23916 The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
5878 Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]