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Single Idea 22514

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason ]

Full Idea

That part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the reason for the sake of which - which is one of the causes - 'cause' being something because-of-which.

Gist of Idea

The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes

Source

Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1226b26)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Eudemian Ethics I,II and VIII', ed/tr. Woods,Michael [OUP 1992], p.31


A Reaction

I take because-of-which to be the correct explanation. Since my model of practical reasoning is partly forensic detection, this seems right. Sherlock Holmes spots causes.


The 31 ideas with the same theme [reasoning processes that lead to action]:

For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes]
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]