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Single Idea 22528

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self ]

Full Idea

Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature.

Gist of Idea

The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it

Source

Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Politics', ed/tr. Reeve,C.D.C. [Hackett 2017], p.7


A Reaction

I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:

The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]