more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 22593
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
]
Full Idea
There can be a difference between our sensation of light and what is in the objects that produce that sensation in us.
Gist of Idea
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation
Source
René Descartes (The World [1631]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 1
Book Ref
Dunt,Ian: 'How to Be a Liberal' [Canbury Press 2020], p.18
A Reaction
Note only that they 'may' differ, and that he does not assert that they are entirely different. Secondary qualities give information, and are not just mental events.
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[qualities seeming to involve the observer]:
1727
|
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible
[Aristotle]
|
16725
|
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced
[Aristotle]
|
5949
|
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies
[Epicurus, by Plutarch]
|
20781
|
Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct
[Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
|
16721
|
Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities
[Giles of Orleans]
|
7401
|
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world
[Galileo, by Tuck]
|
5454
|
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures
[Galileo]
|
22593
|
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation
[Descartes]
|
15964
|
Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind'
[Boyle, by Alexander,P]
|
15962
|
Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles
[Boyle, by Alexander,P]
|
15973
|
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers)
[Locke, by Alexander,P]
|
7050
|
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind'
[Locke, by Heil]
|
15979
|
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object
[Locke]
|
19430
|
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving
[Leibniz]
|
23638
|
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them
[Reid]
|
5532
|
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
[Kant]
|
21447
|
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object
[Kant]
|
6498
|
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities
[Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
|
7440
|
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
[Armstrong]
|
22412
|
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
[McGinn]
|
22421
|
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
[McGinn]
|
22424
|
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
[McGinn]
|
22425
|
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
[McGinn]
|
6494
|
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
[Robinson,H]
|
6499
|
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
[Robinson,H]
|
6500
|
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
[Robinson,H]
|
4108
|
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
[Crane]
|
7044
|
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
[Heil]
|
7052
|
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
[Heil]
|
15061
|
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals
[Fine,K]
|
9118
|
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics
[Sorensen]
|
6375
|
The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness
[Polger]
|