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Single Idea 22612
[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
]
Full Idea
Endurance and perdurance are not explanations, but are merely characterisations of persistance with the constraints imposed by either an A or a B view of time.
Gist of Idea
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time
Source
R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time', ed/tr. Callender,Craig [OUP 2013], p.20
A Reaction
This is 3-D asnd 4-D objects. A simple and illuminating observation. I love reading broad brush books that make all these simple connections between what seem isolated theories in philosophy. These links are the heart of the subject.
Related Idea
Idea 7802
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
The
32 ideas
from 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'
22606
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Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything
[Ingthorsson]
|
22605
|
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations
[Ingthorsson]
|
22607
|
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena
[Ingthorsson]
|
22608
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Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes
[Ingthorsson]
|
22610
|
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic
[Ingthorsson]
|
22609
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Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory
[Ingthorsson]
|
22611
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Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback
[Ingthorsson]
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22639
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Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction
[Ingthorsson]
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22614
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Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it
[Ingthorsson]
|
22613
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Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent
[Ingthorsson]
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22612
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Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time
[Ingthorsson]
|
22615
|
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist
[Ingthorsson]
|
22616
|
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions
[Ingthorsson]
|
22617
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Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional
[Ingthorsson]
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22618
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In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes
[Ingthorsson]
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22619
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Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect
[Ingthorsson]
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22620
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If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects
[Ingthorsson]
|
22621
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Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions
[Ingthorsson]
|
22622
|
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics
[Ingthorsson]
|
22624
|
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes
[Ingthorsson]
|
22625
|
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects
[Ingthorsson]
|
22627
|
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them
[Ingthorsson]
|
22629
|
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological
[Ingthorsson]
|
22630
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If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible
[Ingthorsson]
|
22631
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Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions
[Ingthorsson]
|
22632
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Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality
[Ingthorsson]
|
22633
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Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image
[Ingthorsson]
|
22634
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Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals
[Ingthorsson]
|
22635
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People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause
[Ingthorsson]
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22637
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Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual
[Ingthorsson]
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22636
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Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless
[Ingthorsson]
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22638
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Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied
[Ingthorsson]
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