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Single Idea 22614

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation ]

Full Idea

The core of agency and interventionist theories of causation is that c counts as the cause of e iff E reliably appears and disappears when you manipulate C.

Gist of Idea

Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it

Source

R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1)

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time', ed/tr. Callender,Craig [OUP 2013], p.23


A Reaction

[C is the type of c; E is the type of e] James Woodward champions this view. Ingthorsson objects that the theory offers no explanation of the appearances and disappearances. You can't manipulate black holes…


The 32 ideas from R.D. Ingthorsson

Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]