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Single Idea 22619

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata ]

Full Idea

By abandoning the standard view that causes are ‘extrinsic motive Agents’, an idea from pre-Newtonian physics, we are free to conceive of the interaction as a whole as the cause, and the change in the compound whole of interacting things as the effect.

Gist of Idea

Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect

Source

R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.06)

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time', ed/tr. Callender,Craig [OUP 2013], p.68

A Reaction

Ingthorsson persuasively presents this as the correct account, as understood by modern science. It is not cause-then-effect. It is kerfuffle, then aftermath.

Related Ideas

Idea 22618 In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]

Idea 22620 If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]

The 32 ideas from 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'

22606 Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
22605 Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
22607 Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
22608 Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
22609 Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
22610 It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]
22611 Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
22639 Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
22614 Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
22613 Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
22612 Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
22615 One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
22616 Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
22617 Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
22618 In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
22619 Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
22620 If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
22621 Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
22622 Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
22624 A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
22625 Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
22627 Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
22629 Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
22630 If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
22631 Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
22632 Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
22633 Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
22634 Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
22635 People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
22637 Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
22636 Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
22638 Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]