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Single Idea 22624

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity ]

Full Idea

Counterexamples involving prevention and/or interference have come to be roughly divided into four main categories: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) finks and (iv) antidotes.

Gist of Idea

A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes

Source

R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 5.3)

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time', ed/tr. Callender,Craig [OUP 2013], p.90


A Reaction

These are the reasons why necessity is denied in causation. i) is in the initial circumstances, ii) is another cause getting there first, iii) is a defusing action in the agent, iv) is a defusing action in the patient. No necessity if one is possible.


The 31 ideas with the same theme [causation as necessitated by nature]:

When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes]
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]
Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz]
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume]
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant]
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel]
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]