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Full Idea
The knowledge of things by their causes, which is often given as a definition of rational knowledge, is useless unless the causes converge to a minimum number, while still producing the maximum number of effects.
Gist of Idea
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number
Source
William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21)
Book Ref
James,William: 'Selected Writings of William James', ed/tr. Bird,Graham [Everyman 1995], p.21
A Reaction
This is certainly the psychological motivation for trying to identify 'the' cause of something, but James always tries to sell such things as subjective. 'Useless' to one person is a subjective criterion; useless to anyone is much more objective.
Related Idea
Idea 13929 Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
| 10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
| 14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
| 22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
| 8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
| 10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
| 14567 | Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum] |