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Single Idea 22889

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time ]

Full Idea

Kant says that instead of focusing on the nouns 'time' and 'space', it would be more on target to focus on the adverbial applications of the concepts - that we don't experience things in time and space so much as experience them temporally and spatially.

Gist of Idea

We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally

Source

report of Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 2 'Kantian'

Book Ref

Bardon,Adrian: 'Brief History of the Philosophy of Time' [OUP 2013], p.33

A Reaction

Put like that, Kant's approach has some plausibility, given that we don't actually experience space and time as entities. To jump from that to idealism seems daft. Does every adverb imply idealism about what it specifies?

The 24 ideas from Adrian Bardon

22889 We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon]
22882 We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon]
22883 It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon]
22886 The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon]
22884 The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon]
22890 We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon]
22892 Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon]
22901 The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
22900 How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon]
22898 What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon]
22902 Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon]
22897 The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon]
22896 The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
22910 To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon]
22909 We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon]
22904 The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon]
22906 The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon]
22907 It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon]
22905 Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon]
22903 The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
22911 At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon]
22912 Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon]
22914 An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon]
22913 The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon]