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Single Idea 22919
[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
]
Full Idea
It is a powerful argument for something's non-existence that it would make absolutely no difference.
Gist of Idea
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist
Source
Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 02 'Everything')
Book Ref
Le Poidevin,Robin: 'Travels in Four Dimensions' [OUP 2003], p.27
A Reaction
Powerful, but not conclusive. Neutrinos don't seem to do much, so it isn't far from there to get a particle which does nothing.
Related Idea
Idea 7022
To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato]
The
48 ideas
from Robin Le Poidevin
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6866
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It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death
[Le Poidevin]
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6865
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A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective
[Le Poidevin]
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6867
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Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world
[Le Poidevin]
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15186
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In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values
[Le Poidevin]
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15187
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It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past
[Le Poidevin]
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15188
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If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense
[Le Poidevin]
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15189
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Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position
[Le Poidevin]
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15191
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At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed
[Le Poidevin]
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15192
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We share a common now, but not a common here
[Le Poidevin]
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15190
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Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil
[Le Poidevin]
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15193
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The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis
[Le Poidevin]
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15195
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If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals
[Le Poidevin]
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15196
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God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems
[Le Poidevin]
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15197
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Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language
[Le Poidevin]
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15198
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In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past)
[Le Poidevin]
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15205
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Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed
[Le Poidevin]
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15206
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It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time
[Le Poidevin]
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15207
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We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories
[Le Poidevin]
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22919
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A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist
[Le Poidevin]
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22917
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Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length
[Le Poidevin]
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22921
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Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending
[Le Poidevin]
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22922
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We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist
[Le Poidevin]
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22923
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Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths
[Le Poidevin]
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22924
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If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition
[Le Poidevin]
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22928
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For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space
[Le Poidevin]
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22927
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The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity
[Le Poidevin]
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22926
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In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive
[Le Poidevin]
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22925
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The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present
[Le Poidevin]
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22937
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If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers
[Le Poidevin]
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22938
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To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real
[Le Poidevin]
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22934
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Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process'
[Le Poidevin]
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22932
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We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world
[Le Poidevin]
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22931
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We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment
[Le Poidevin]
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22939
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The B-series doesn't seem to allow change
[Le Poidevin]
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22940
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If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it?
[Le Poidevin]
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22944
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The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants
[Le Poidevin]
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22942
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If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short
[Le Poidevin]
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22943
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Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere
[Le Poidevin]
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22941
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How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient?
[Le Poidevin]
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22945
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The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times
[Le Poidevin]
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22946
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The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces
[Le Poidevin]
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22947
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An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later
[Le Poidevin]
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22952
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If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected?
[Le Poidevin]
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22953
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Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect
[Le Poidevin]
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22951
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If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events
[Le Poidevin]
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22948
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There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time
[Le Poidevin]
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22949
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Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete
[Le Poidevin]
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22950
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If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable
[Le Poidevin]
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