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Single Idea 22923
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
]
Full Idea
Absolutists say space plays a number of roles. It is what we refer to when we talk of positions. It makes other things possible (by moving into unoccupied positions). And it explains geometrical truths.
Gist of Idea
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths
Source
Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Redundancy')
Book Ref
Le Poidevin,Robin: 'Travels in Four Dimensions' [OUP 2003], p.41
A Reaction
I am persuaded by these, and am happy to treat space (and time) as a primitive of metaphysics.
The
48 ideas
from Robin Le Poidevin
6866
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It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death
[Le Poidevin]
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6865
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A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective
[Le Poidevin]
|
6867
|
Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world
[Le Poidevin]
|
15186
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In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values
[Le Poidevin]
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15187
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It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past
[Le Poidevin]
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15188
|
If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense
[Le Poidevin]
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15189
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Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position
[Le Poidevin]
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15191
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At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed
[Le Poidevin]
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15192
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We share a common now, but not a common here
[Le Poidevin]
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15190
|
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil
[Le Poidevin]
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15193
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The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis
[Le Poidevin]
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15195
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If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals
[Le Poidevin]
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15196
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God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems
[Le Poidevin]
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15197
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Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language
[Le Poidevin]
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15198
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In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past)
[Le Poidevin]
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15205
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Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed
[Le Poidevin]
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15206
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It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time
[Le Poidevin]
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15207
|
We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories
[Le Poidevin]
|
22919
|
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist
[Le Poidevin]
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22917
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Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length
[Le Poidevin]
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22921
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Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending
[Le Poidevin]
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22922
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We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist
[Le Poidevin]
|
22923
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Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths
[Le Poidevin]
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22924
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If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition
[Le Poidevin]
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22928
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For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space
[Le Poidevin]
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22927
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The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity
[Le Poidevin]
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22926
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In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive
[Le Poidevin]
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22925
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The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present
[Le Poidevin]
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22937
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If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers
[Le Poidevin]
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22938
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To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real
[Le Poidevin]
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22934
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Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process'
[Le Poidevin]
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22932
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We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world
[Le Poidevin]
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22931
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We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment
[Le Poidevin]
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22939
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The B-series doesn't seem to allow change
[Le Poidevin]
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22940
|
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it?
[Le Poidevin]
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22944
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The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants
[Le Poidevin]
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22942
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If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short
[Le Poidevin]
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22943
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Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere
[Le Poidevin]
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22941
|
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient?
[Le Poidevin]
|
22945
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The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times
[Le Poidevin]
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22946
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The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces
[Le Poidevin]
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22947
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An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later
[Le Poidevin]
|
22952
|
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected?
[Le Poidevin]
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22953
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Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect
[Le Poidevin]
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22951
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If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events
[Le Poidevin]
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22948
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There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time
[Le Poidevin]
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22949
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Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete
[Le Poidevin]
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22950
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If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable
[Le Poidevin]
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