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Single Idea 22926

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation ]

Full Idea

Not all explanations are causal. We can explain some things by showing what follows logically from what, or what is required by the definition of a term, or in terms of purpose.

Gist of Idea

In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive

Source

Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Limits')

Book Ref

Le Poidevin,Robin: 'Travels in Four Dimensions' [OUP 2003], p.78

A Reaction

Would these fully qualify as 'explanations'? You don't explain the sea by saying that 'wet' is part of its definition.

The 30 ideas from 'Travels in Four Dimensions'

22919 A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
22917 Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
22921 Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
22922 We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
22923 Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
22924 If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
22928 For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
22927 The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
22926 In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
22925 The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
22937 If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
22938 To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
22934 Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
22931 We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
22932 We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
22939 The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
22940 If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
22944 The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
22943 Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
22942 If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
22941 How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
22945 The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
22946 The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
22947 An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
22952 If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
22953 Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
22951 If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
22948 There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
22949 Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
22950 If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]