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Single Idea 22928

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space ]

Full Idea

For the relationist, if Archytas goes to the edge of space and extends his arm, he is creating a new spatial relation between objects, and thus extending space, which is, after all, just the collection of thos relations.

Gist of Idea

For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space

Source

Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'beyond')

Book Ref

Le Poidevin,Robin: 'Travels in Four Dimensions' [OUP 2003], p.93

A Reaction

The obvious point is what are you moving your arm into? And how can some movements be in space, while others create new space? It's a bad theory.

The 30 ideas from 'Travels in Four Dimensions'

22919 A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
22917 Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
22921 Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
22922 We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
22923 Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
22924 If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
22928 For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
22927 The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
22926 In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
22925 The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
22937 If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
22938 To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
22934 Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
22931 We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
22932 We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
22939 The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
22940 If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
22944 The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
22943 Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
22942 If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
22941 How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
22945 The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
22946 The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
22947 An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
22952 If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
22953 Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
22951 If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
22948 There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
22949 Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
22950 If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]