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Single Idea 23007

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series ]

Full Idea

The view that time has a direction is entirely consistent with the B-theory of time, as long as time's having a direction is not a matter of it having temporal flow.

Gist of Idea

The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow

Source

Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.5)

Book Ref

Baron,S/Miller,K: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Time' [Polity 2019], p.136


A Reaction

I'm not sure how you could account for an intrinsic direction to time if it is not because of the 'flow'. The B-series seems to invite a reductive account of time's direction (e.g. to entropy).


The 12 ideas with the same theme [B-series, of equal times, with no past-present-future]:

Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller]