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Single Idea 23010
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
]
Full Idea
An option for accounting for the direction of time would be to appeal to the direction of causation …to the future is the direction towards which there are effects, and the past is the direction towards which there are causes.
Gist of Idea
We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects
Source
Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6.2)
Book Ref
Baron,S/Miller,K: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Time' [Polity 2019], p.142
A Reaction
The obvious problem is that we can no longer pick out a cause by saying it 'precedes' its effect. It is not obvious what other criterion can be used to distinguish them (esp. given Hume's regularity account).
The
36 ideas
from 'Intro to the Philosophy of Time'
22986
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The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction
[Baron/Miller]
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22987
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The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects
[Baron/Miller]
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22989
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Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2
[Baron/Miller]
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22988
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The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series
[Baron/Miller]
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22990
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The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future
[Baron/Miller]
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22991
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How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real?
[Baron/Miller]
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22992
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If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing
[Baron/Miller]
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22994
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Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised'
[Baron/Miller]
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22993
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For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't
[Baron/Miller]
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22995
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Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time
[Baron/Miller]
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22996
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The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties
[Baron/Miller]
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22998
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How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times?
[Baron/Miller]
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22997
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The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property
[Baron/Miller]
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22999
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It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow
[Baron/Miller]
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23000
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Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level
[Baron/Miller]
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23001
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The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference
[Baron/Miller]
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23002
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In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric
[Baron/Miller]
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23003
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Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic
[Baron/Miller]
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23004
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The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else
[Baron/Miller]
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23005
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The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature
[Baron/Miller]
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23006
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Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy
[Baron/Miller]
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23007
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The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow
[Baron/Miller]
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23008
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Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things
[Baron/Miller]
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23009
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There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates
[Baron/Miller]
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23010
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We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects
[Baron/Miller]
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23011
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Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals
[Baron/Miller]
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23013
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The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge
[Baron/Miller]
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23014
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If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?)
[Baron/Miller]
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23015
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The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are
[Baron/Miller]
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23016
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Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system
[Baron/Miller]
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23017
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Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist
[Baron/Miller]
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23018
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How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time?
[Baron/Miller]
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23020
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If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist
[Baron/Miller]
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23022
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Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit
[Baron/Miller]
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23023
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How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist?
[Baron/Miller]
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23024
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A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original!
[Baron/Miller]
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