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Single Idea 2308

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique ]

Full Idea

The two principle arguments which overthrew the mind-brain identity theory were the multiple realization argument of Hilary Putnam, and the anomalist argument of Davidson, which contained the seeds of functionalism and anomalous monism.

Gist of Idea

Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.002)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.2

A Reaction

The first argument strikes me as significant and interesting, but Davidson seems weak. It makes the unsubstantiated claim that mind is outside the laws of physics, and irreducible.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [attempts to prove that mind is not just physical]:

1909 How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
5885 Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
5951 If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
6229 Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
6382 The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger]
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
3002 If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
3150 Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey]
3129 Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey]
4072 The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
3448 Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance]