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Single Idea 2313
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
]
Full Idea
The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact.
Gist of Idea
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.13
A Reaction
This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that.
The
22 ideas
from 'Mind in a Physical World'
13314
|
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal
[Kim, by Seneca]
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2308
|
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
[Kim]
|
2309
|
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
[Kim]
|
2310
|
Supervenience is linked to dependence
[Kim]
|
2311
|
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
[Kim]
|
2313
|
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
[Kim]
|
2314
|
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
[Kim]
|
2315
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Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
[Kim]
|
2317
|
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency
[Kim, by PG]
|
2318
|
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes
[Kim, by PG]
|
2319
|
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
[Kim]
|
2320
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Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
[Kim]
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2322
|
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
|
2323
|
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
[Kim]
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2324
|
Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
|
2325
|
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
|
2327
|
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
[Kim]
|
2328
|
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
[Kim]
|
2329
|
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
[Kim]
|
1550
|
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"?
[Plato on Kim]
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2065
|
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people
[Plato on Kim]
|
530
|
There are two contradictory arguments about everything
[Kim]
|