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Single Idea 23189

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts ]

Full Idea

Concepts are more or less definite groups of sensations that arrive together.

Gist of Idea

Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[086])

Book Ref

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Fragments from 1885-86 (v 16)', ed/tr. Del Caro,Adrian [Stanford 2020], p.23

A Reaction

I like this because I favour accounts of concepts which root them in experience, and largely growing unthinking out of communcal experience. Nietzsche is very empirical here. Hume would probably agree.

The 28 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about concepts]:

20804 Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
12911 Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
17616 Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
5553 Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
5593 Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
15607 We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
15610 Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
20953 Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
8715 Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend]
23189 Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
23192 Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
9870 Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
5384 A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
8245 The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
13865 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
13866 A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
10344 Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
10110 Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
17980 The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
16365 Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
8688 Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend]
19088 For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
11120 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18574 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
18588 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
18611 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]