more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 23190
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
]
Full Idea
We have a double brain: our capacity to will, to feel and to think of our willing, feeling, thinking ourselves is what we summarise with the word 'consciousness'.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life
Source
Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[087])
Book Ref
Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Fragments from 1885-86 (v 16)', ed/tr. Del Caro,Adrian [Stanford 2020], p.24
A Reaction
Pretty much the modern HOT (higher order thought) theory of consciousness. Higher order thought distinguishes us from the other animals, but I think they too are probably conscious, so I don't agree. Why is level 2 conscious of level 1?
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:
|
5002
|
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind
[Locke]
|
|
4086
|
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception')
[Kant, by Crane]
|
|
23190
|
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life
[Nietzsche]
|
|
7111
|
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself
[Sartre]
|
|
4888
|
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
|
|
2453
|
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
|
|
7885
|
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
|
|
7886
|
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
|
|
7887
|
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
|
|
7888
|
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
|
|
8895
|
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present
[Bonjour]
|
|
12586
|
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
[Peacocke]
|
|
9320
|
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception
[Gulick]
|
|
9321
|
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality
[Gulick]
|
|
9322
|
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like
[Gulick]
|
|
9314
|
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error
[Kriegel/Williford]
|