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Single Idea 23192
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
]
Full Idea
A concept is an invention that doesn't correspond entirely to anything; but to many things a little bit.
Gist of Idea
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit
Source
Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131])
Book Ref
Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Fragments from 1885-86 (v 16)', ed/tr. Del Caro,Adrian [Stanford 2020], p.37
A Reaction
This seems to cover some concepts quite well, but others not at all. What else does 'square' correspond to?
The
28 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about concepts]:
20804
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Concepts are intellectual phantasms
[Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
|
12911
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Concepts are what unite a proposition
[Leibniz]
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17616
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Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
[Kant]
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5553
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Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
[Kant]
|
5593
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Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
[Kant]
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15607
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We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts
[Hegel]
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15610
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Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it
[Hegel]
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20953
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Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not
[Hegel, by Bowie]
|
8715
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Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability
[Cantor, by Friend]
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23189
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Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations
[Nietzsche]
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23192
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Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit
[Nietzsche]
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9870
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Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted
[Frege, by Dummett]
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5384
|
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'
[Russell]
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16366
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The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
[Evans]
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8245
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The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces
[Deleuze/Guattari]
|
13865
|
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities
[Wright,C]
|
13866
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A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity
[Wright,C]
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16535
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A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist
[Lowe]
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10344
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Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
[Kusch]
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10110
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Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets)
[George/Velleman]
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17980
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The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge
[Murphy]
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16365
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Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
[Recanati]
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8688
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Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization)
[Friend]
|
19088
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For pragmatists a concept means its consequences
[Macbeth]
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11120
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Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses
[Margolis/Laurence]
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18574
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Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different
[Machery]
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18588
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Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location
[Machery]
|
18611
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We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory'
[Machery]
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