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Single Idea 23206

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique ]

Full Idea

There are schematic minds, those who hold a thought-complex to be truer if it can be sketched into previously drafted schemata or categorical tables. There are countless self-deceptions in this area: nearly all the great 'systems' belong here.

Gist of Idea

Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 40[09])

Book Ref

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Fragments from 1885-86 (v 16)', ed/tr. Del Caro,Adrian [Stanford 2020], p.187

A Reaction

Why 'nearly all'? Aristotle might be a candidate for such a person. Leibniz, perhaps. Nietzsche identified with Becoming and Heraclitus, as opposed to Being and Parmenides.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of the coherentist view]:

23206 Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
8879 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
8891 My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
8892 Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
8894 Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
3590 Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
3589 Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
10340 Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
10345 Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
19721 Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]