more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 2322

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability ]

Full Idea

Multiple realization goes deeper and wider than biological species, and even in the same individual the neural realizer, or correlate, of a given mental state or function may change over time through maturation and brain injuries.

Gist of Idea

Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.095)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.95

A Reaction

The tricky question here is what you mean by 'change'. How different must a pattern of neurons be before you say it is of a different type? How do you individuate a type?

The 22 ideas from 'Mind in a Physical World'

13314 Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
2309 Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
2310 Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
2311 Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
2313 Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
2314 Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
2315 Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
2317 Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
2318 Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
2319 Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
2320 Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
2322 Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
2323 Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
2327 Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
2328 The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
1550 Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
2065 Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
530 There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]