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Single Idea 23231

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception ]

Full Idea

Immediately I know only of myself. What I am able to know beyond that I am only able to know through inference.

Gist of Idea

I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference

Source

Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)

Book Ref

Fichte,Johann G.: 'The Vocation of Man', ed/tr. Preuss,Peter [Hackett 1987], p.14

A Reaction

A direct descendant of the Cartesian Cogito, I assume. Personally, if I bang my head on a beam I take the beam to be a full paid-up member of reality. Is it not possible that he also knows himself through inference? Do animals infer reality?

The 21 ideas with the same theme [inference is an essential part of perception]:

1544 Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus]
5220 Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
12482 Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
13005 Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
23454 Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant]
23231 I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
6935 In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach]
16859 Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
24130 An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
18309 The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
15248 Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden]
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
2465 Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
4109 If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]