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Single Idea 2324

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism ]

Full Idea

There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account.

Gist of Idea

Intentionality as function seems possible

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.101

A Reaction

I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [mind is a causal network of functions]:

2683 Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
1718 Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
3461 Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
2467 Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
8131 Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
3186 If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
3127 Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
6541 Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
6545 If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]