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Single Idea 23241

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism ]

Full Idea

I sense in myself, not in the object, for I am myself and not the object; therefore I sense only myself and my condition, and not the condition of the object.

Gist of Idea

I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object

Source

Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 2)

Book Ref

Fichte,Johann G.: 'The Vocation of Man', ed/tr. Preuss,Peter [Hackett 1987], p.31


A Reaction

I'm not clear why anyone would have total confidence in internal experience and almost no confidence in experience of externals. In daily life I am equally confident about both. In philosophical mode I make equally cautious judgements about both.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [reality exists with our cognitive structure]:

Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach]
Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach]
For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner]
The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard]
'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant]
We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant]
We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant]
Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant]
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
Poetry is transcendental when it connects the ideal to the real [Schlegel,F]
The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach]
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]