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Single Idea 23243

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self ]

Full Idea

Q. So that constantly and under all circumstances my consciousness of things outside of me is accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of myself? A. Quite so.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self

Source

Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 2)

Book Ref

Fichte,Johann G.: 'The Vocation of Man', ed/tr. Preuss,Peter [Hackett 1987], p.53


A Reaction

He should be more cautious about asserting the existence of something 'unnoticed'. The Earth's core is unnoticed by me, but there is plenty of evidence for it. Not so sure about unnoticed self. Still, I think central control of the mind is indispensable.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:

The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]