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Single Idea 23245
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
]
Full Idea
No knowledge can be its own foundation and proof. Every knowledge presupposes something still higher as its foundation, and this ascent has no end.
Gist of Idea
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities
Source
Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)
Book Ref
Fichte,Johann G.: 'The Vocation of Man', ed/tr. Preuss,Peter [Hackett 1987], p.71
A Reaction
A metaphor that's hard to visualise! He must have in mind a priori as well as empirical knowledge. The 'higher' levels don't seem to be God, but some region of absolute rationality, to which free minds have access. I think.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:
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1670
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When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind
[Aristotle]
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20795
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Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
[Sext.Empiricus]
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5004
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We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
[Descartes]
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23245
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Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities
[Fichte]
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6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
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4257
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The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
[Bonjour]
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2756
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If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
[Dancy,J]
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8896
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Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
[Bonjour]
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
[Pollock/Cruz]
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
[Baggini /Fosl]
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8845
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An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief
[Pryor]
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19719
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'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible
[Grundmann]
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