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Single Idea 23246

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition ]

Full Idea

Faith is no knowledge, but a decision of the will to recognise the validity of knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will

Source

Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)

Book Ref

Fichte,Johann G.: 'The Vocation of Man', ed/tr. Preuss,Peter [Hackett 1987], p.71


A Reaction

What matters is the grounds for the decision. Mad conspiracy theories are decisions of the will which are false. Legitimate faith is an intuition of coherence which cannot be fully articulated.


The 26 ideas with the same theme [direct awareness of knowledge]:

Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke]
Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro]
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte]
Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge]
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon]
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]