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Single Idea 2325
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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Full Idea
It seems to me inconceivable that a possible world exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality.
Gist of Idea
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.101
A Reaction
Personally I can't conceive of such a world lacking qualia either. The physical entails the mental, say I.
The
22 ideas
from 'Mind in a Physical World'
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13314
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Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal
[Kim, by Seneca]
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2308
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Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
[Kim]
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2309
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Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
[Kim]
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2310
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Supervenience is linked to dependence
[Kim]
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2311
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Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
[Kim]
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2313
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Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
[Kim]
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2314
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Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
[Kim]
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2315
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Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
[Kim]
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2317
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Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency
[Kim, by PG]
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2318
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Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes
[Kim, by PG]
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2319
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Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
[Kim]
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2320
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Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
[Kim]
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
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2323
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Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
[Kim]
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2325
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It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
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2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
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2327
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Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
[Kim]
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2328
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The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
[Kim]
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2329
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Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
[Kim]
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1550
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Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"?
[Plato on Kim]
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2065
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Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people
[Plato on Kim]
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530
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There are two contradictory arguments about everything
[Kim]
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